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Investments in flexible generation capacity in an energy-only market

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MESW02 - Electricity systems of the future: incentives, regulation and analysis for efficient investment

A de-carbonized energy system will require sufficient investments in flexible generation capacity. The goal of this paper is to study how market design affects investments in flexible generation capacity.  If markets are perfectly competitive, production costs are convex, and demand is perfectly predictable, then independent energy-only market (one for each hour of operation) will lead to efficient market outcomes both in the short-run (market operation) and in the long-run (investment levels and levels of flexibility). We will relax the assumption of convex production costs and predictable demand and analyze first whether small competitive investors have the right incentives to invest in flexible generation. In a second step we intend to derive equilibrium investment levels. 

This talk is part of the Isaac Newton Institute Seminar Series series.

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