University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Isaac Newton Institute Seminar Series > State Space Collapse in Resource Allocation for Demand Dispatch

State Space Collapse in Resource Allocation for Demand Dispatch

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

If you have a question about this talk, please contact info@newton.ac.uk.

MESW03 - Closing workshop: Looking forward to 2050

The term demand dispatch refers to the creation of virtual energy storage from deferrable loads. The key to success is automation: an appropriate distributed control architecture ensures that bounds on quality of service (QoS) are met and simultaneously ensures that the loads provide aggregate grid services comparable to a large battery system. A question addressed in our 2018 CDC paper is how to control a large collection of heterogeneous loads. This is in part a resource allocation problem, since different classes of loads are more valuable for different services. The evolution of QoS for each class of loads is modeled via a state of charge surrogate, which is a part of the leaky battery model for the load classes. The goal of this paper is to unveil the structure of the optimal solution and investigate short term market implications. The following conclusions are obtained:
(i) Optimal power deviation for each of the M  2 load classes evolves in a two-dimensional manifold.
(ii) Marginal cost for each load class evolves in a two-dimensional subspace: spanned by a co-state process and its derivative.
(iii) The preceding conclusions are applied to construct a dynamic competitive equilibrium model, in which the consumer utility is the negative of the cost of deviation from ideal QoS. It is found that a competitive equilibrium exists, and that the resulting price signals are very different than what would be obtained based on the standard assumption that the utility is with respect to power consumption. It is argued that price signals are not useful for control of the grid since they are inherently open loop. However, the analysis may inform the creation of heuristics for payments within the context of contracts for services with consumers.

This talk is part of the Isaac Newton Institute Seminar Series series.

Tell a friend about this talk:

This talk is included in these lists:

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.

 

© 2006-2019 Talks.cam, University of Cambridge. Contact Us | Help and Documentation | Privacy and Publicity