University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Microsoft Research Cambridge, public talks > Proactive Resilience Revisited: Resisting Intrusions means more than Byzantine Fault Tolerance

Proactive Resilience Revisited: Resisting Intrusions means more than Byzantine Fault Tolerance

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Microsoft Research Cambridge Talks Admins.

Abstract: Byzantine Fault/Intrusion Tolerance has become a reference paradigm for dealing with faults and intrusions, achieving security (and dependability) in an automatic way, much along the lines of classical fault tolerance. However, there are issues specific to malicious faults (attacks and intrusions) that bring about some problems and limitations to the paradigm as a basis for designing resilient systems, some of which quite unexpected. We wish to discuss the limitations of some theoretical underpinnings of Byzantine Fault/Intrusion Tolerance in distributed systems, and report on some research results evaluating some of those limitations.

This talk is part of the Microsoft Research Cambridge, public talks series.

Tell a friend about this talk:

This talk is included in these lists:

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.

 

© 2006-2019 Talks.cam, University of Cambridge. Contact Us | Help and Documentation | Privacy and Publicity