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Farewell to content

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This paper defends a neo-Dennettian view of the psychosemantics program; on the attempt to develop a reductive naturalist theory of mental content. It takes the teleosemantic program to be the current flagship version of reductive naturalism, and the paper appeals to recent work on human cognitive and social evolution (including my own recent work) to argue that there are fundamental problems in trying to extend a teleosemantics of animal cognition to human cognition. But it also argues (admittedly, more sketchily) that this should not be seen as a threat to a naturalistic conception of human cognitive and communicative life.

This talk is part of the CamPoS (Cambridge Philosophy of Science) seminar series.

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