University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Optimization and Incentives Seminar > A Framework for Decentralised Combinatorial Auctions with Applications to Subadditive Bidders

A Framework for Decentralised Combinatorial Auctions with Applications to Subadditive Bidders

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We present a framework for decentralised combinatorial auctions and an underlying solution concept called strongness. For bidders with superadditive valuations, our framework encompasses some existing auctions. For bidders with subadditive valuations, we develop a new auction under the framework above. With submodular valuations and identical items, under straightforward bidding the revenue generated by the new auction is at least the revenue generated by the VCG mechanism. We show that there are examples in which the new auction results in a different outcome than the VCG mechanism with a revenue strictly greater than that of the VCG assuming a straightforward bidding strategy. (Joint work with Mahyar Salek.)

This talk is part of the Optimization and Incentives Seminar series.

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