University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Cambridge Finance Workshop Series > Why Do Institutions Delay Reporting Their Shareholdings? Evidence from Form 13F

Why Do Institutions Delay Reporting Their Shareholdings? Evidence from Form 13F

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  • UserSusan Christoffersen is an Associate Professor of Finance, Rotman School of Management World_link
  • ClockThursday 26 November 2015, 13:00-14:00
  • HouseRoom W2.02 Judge Business School.

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Institutional investors are allowed to delay their disclosures of quarter-end holdings via form 13F for up to 45 days. This forbearance may help protect the institutions from potentially damaging behavior by other traders, in particular from free-riding copycatters and from front-runners. It also may help the institutions hide their voting power, and this has prompted public corporations to request a much shorter maximum reporting lag. We look at 14 years of 13F filings to gauge the role of these three motives in the decision to delay disclosure, and the results indicate that front-running and voting, but not copycatting, motivate delays.

This talk is part of the Cambridge Finance Workshop Series series.

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