Abstract

This talk will present a case study from the ongoing project Dungeness B Power station on the replacement of its Data Processing System with a modern equivalent system. The first part of the talk will provide a general background of the replacement project, including an overview of the safety case approach being adopted in the project. The second part will then focus on the specific aspects of software testing of so-called “high-integrity” control applications within the replacement system.

Safety related systems refer to systems whose malfunction, either directly or indirectly, can lead to safety of the overall system being compromised. Unlike “safety system”, i.e. systems directly responsible for the safety of the plant, safety related systems may have less onerous safety claims and can be based on more complex technologies or implementation platforms. Verification/validation of safety related systems can thus pause significant challenges, in terms of safety assessment of the underlying hardware, firmware and in particular, the software. This talk will highlight some of the issues faced when verifying a large-scale system with modest safety claim compared to those observed elsewhere, e.g. in defence and aerospace sectors.