Abstract

Synthetic biology aims to make biology easier to engineer. The idea is that scientists and engineers can work together to implement a rational design cycle similar to that used in aeronautics or informatics, but based on biological parts rather than mechanical and electronic ones. Well-characterised and catalogued biological parts would be assembled into devices and larger systems that predictably perform human-designed functions within host cells – renamed “chassis” in this context. Proponents of this emerging field argue that it has huge economic and industrial potential and that it can help address important global health, energy and environmental problems. At the same time, worries are expressed that by making biology easier for anyone to engineer, the knowledge and biological parts produced could be used by ‘outsiders’ for malevolent purposes, such as bioweapons, or that unqualified DIY biologists may inadvertently unleash harmful organisms into the environment. Proponents also worry that ‘the public’ will react unfavourably to the idea of scientists making ‘living machines’ or ‘creating Life from scratch’. I will argue that, somewhat ironically, expectations about the potential use of synthetic biology by terrorists and about fearful public reactions are part of the promissory construction of synthetic biology. Positive and negative expectations for synthetic biology are based on the same speculative assumptions about the field’s ability to produce and provide easy access to well-characterised biological parts that function predictably when assembled and inserted into living chassis. My research on contemporary experimental practices of synthetic biologists suggests that challenging these assumptions is important and would lead to re-directing policy concerns and public debate to more mundane but no less important issues, for example about what happens if and when the predictability and containment of engineered biology cannot be assured.