University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Departmental Seminars in History and Philosophy of Science > Perceptual knowledge and discrimination (work in progress)

Perceptual knowledge and discrimination (work in progress)

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Stephen John.

This paper discusses the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination. In particular, it argues for a re-evaluation of a range of cases that have been central to epistemological discussion and which have prompted some to question the truth of certain highly plausible epistemic principles, such as the ‘closure’ principle for knowledge. It is claimed that provided one has the right understanding of the perceptual knowledge at issue in these cases, then they pose no problem for such principles. Furthermore, it is argued that accepting these principles does not commit one to a ‘discrimination’ principle for knowledge, a principle that can initially seem plausible but which places an unduly austere constraint on knowledge. Finally, it is claimed that further support for this picture of the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination can be gleaned by considering the conditions under which claims to know are inappropriate, and by distinguishing the cases under discussion from sceptical cases which, it is argued, require a separate treatment, despite being apparently analogous.

This talk is part of the Departmental Seminars in History and Philosophy of Science series.

Tell a friend about this talk:

This talk is included in these lists:

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.

 

© 2006-2021 Talks.cam, University of Cambridge. Contact Us | Help and Documentation | Privacy and Publicity