Abstract

This paper discusses the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination. In particular, it argues for a re-evaluation of a range of cases that have been central to epistemological discussion and which have prompted some to question the truth of certain highly plausible epistemic principles, such as the ‘closure’ principle for knowledge. It is claimed that provided one has the right understanding of the perceptual knowledge at issue in these cases, then they pose no problem for such principles. Furthermore, it is argued that accepting these principles does not commit one to a ‘discrimination’ principle for knowledge, a principle that can initially seem plausible but which places an unduly austere constraint on knowledge. Finally, it is claimed that further support for this picture of the relationship between perceptual knowledge and discrimination can be gleaned by considering the conditions under which claims to know are inappropriate, and by distinguishing the cases under discussion from sceptical cases which, it is argued, require a separate treatment, despite being apparently analogous.