University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Microsoft Research Cambridge, public talks > Lottery Auctions

Lottery Auctions

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Microsoft Research Cambridge Talks Admins.

This event may be recorded and made available internally or externally via http://research.microsoft.com. Microsoft will own the copyright of any recordings made. If you do not wish to have your image/voice recorded please consider this before attending

The talk discusses some single object sale lottery auctions (LA), where the winner is randomly drawn, with a probability proportional to the price bid. Such auctions are similar to commonly used formats of national and charity lotteries (NCL), where the winning probability depends on the number of tickets bought. However, LA differ from NCL since the object value is not endogenously determined by the amount invested by participants but rather is exogenous. For this reason the LA we study are more akin to contests “a là Tullock”. In particular, we consider a form of “second price lottery auction”. Unlike the standard Vickrey auction, an interesting result in the simplest model with two players and complete information is that in the only Nash Equilibrium where both players submit a positive price, bidders may reveal the opponent’s value and not their own value. For this reason, we named this “mirror revelation”.

This talk is part of the Microsoft Research Cambridge, public talks series.

Tell a friend about this talk:

This talk is included in these lists:

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.

 

© 2006-2024 Talks.cam, University of Cambridge. Contact Us | Help and Documentation | Privacy and Publicity