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Evolutionary dynamics in a continuous public goods game

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If you have a question about this talk, please contact Zoubin Ghahramani .

Why do cooperating individuals prevail in a microbial population although running the risk of being exploited by cheating individuals? We explore this so-called “dilemma of cooperation” and mechanisms to resolve it in simple population dynamic toy models. In my talk I will give a short introduction to population dynamics and evolutionary game theory and present a possible mechanism that supports cooperative behaviour.

This talk is part of the Machine Learning @ CUED series.

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