University of Cambridge > Talks.cam > Computer Laboratory Security Seminar > The Million-Key Question : Investigating the Origins of RSA Public Keys (Best Paper Award @ USENIX Security 2016)

The Million-Key Question : Investigating the Origins of RSA Public Keys (Best Paper Award @ USENIX Security 2016)

Add to your list(s) Download to your calendar using vCal

If you have a question about this talk, please contact Laurent Simon.

Abstract: Can bits of an RSA public key leak information about design and implementation choices such as the prime generation algorithm? We analysed over 60 million freshly generated key pairs from 22 open- and closed-source libraries and from 16 different smartcards, revealing significant leakage. The bias introduced by different choices is sufficiently large to classify a probable library or smartcard with high accuracy based only on the values of public keys. Such a classification can be used to decrease the anonymity set of users of anonymous mailers or operators of linked Tor hidden services, to quickly detect keys from the same vulnerable library or to verify a claim of use of secure hardware by a remote party. The classification of the key origins of more than 10 million RSA -based IPv4 TLS keys and 1.4 million PGP keys also provides an independent estimation of the libraries that are most commonly used to generate the keys found on the Internet. Our broad inspection also provides both sanity check and deep insight regarding which of the recommendations for RSA key pair generation are followed in practice, including closed-source libraries and smartcards.

The talk will be based on Usenix Security 2016 paper and will also provide fresh details from our continuous analysis of more libraries and smartcards we perform after the conference itself.

This talk is part of the Computer Laboratory Security Seminar series.

Tell a friend about this talk:

This talk is included in these lists:

Note that ex-directory lists are not shown.

 

© 2006-2024 Talks.cam, University of Cambridge. Contact Us | Help and Documentation | Privacy and Publicity