Abstract

It is widely believed that Einstein’s motivations for rejecting quantum theory as a fundamental physical theory has long been undermined by Bell’s theorem. Einstein rejected quantum theory as a fundamental physical theory because, as he put it, it “cannot be reconciled with the idea that physics should represent a reality in time and space, free from spooky actions at a distance.” On the other hand, Bell’s theorem is believed to have proved that, let alone quantum theory, no physical theory can be reconciled with the idea of local reality demanded by Einstein. It turns out, however, that, by refining the system of numbers used by Bell to represent the elements of physical reality, his theorem can be rendered irrelevant for the notion of local reality. I will demonstrate this fact by means of an explicit counterexample to Bell’s theorem, based on a generalized system of directed numbers developed by Grassmann, Clifford, and Hestenes. This opens up the possibility of a fully deterministic, local, and realistic underpinning of the quantum phenomena.