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SUMMARY:Optical surveillance on silicon chips: your crypto keys are visibl
 e - Sergei Skorobogatov
DTSTART:20091013T151500Z
DTEND:20091013T161500Z
UID:TALK20564@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Joseph Bonneau
DESCRIPTION:This talk presents a low-cost approach to optical side-channel
  attacks on secure semiconductor chips. By using an inexpensive CCD camera
  to monitor the emission from operating chip\, information stored in SRAM\
 , EEPROM and Flash was successfully recovered. Initially demonstrated on a
  0.9-micron microcontroller\, this technique was later adapted for a 0.13-
 micron secure FPGA with AES decryption engine used for code protection. Th
 is shows the danger of optical emission analysis attacks to modern deep-su
 bmicron chips. Optical emissions from an operating chip also have a good c
 orrelation with power analysis traces and can therefore be used to estimat
 e the contribution of different areas within the chip. Optical emission an
 alysis can also be used for partial reverse engineering of the chip struct
 ure by spotting the active areas. This can assist in carrying out optical 
 fault injection attacks later\, thereby saving the time otherwise required
  for exhaustive search. Practical limits for optical emission  analysis in
  terms of sample preparation\, operating conditions and chip technology wi
 ll be discussed. Like with the introduction of probing attacks in the mid-
 1990s\, power analysis attacks in the late 1990s and optical injection att
 acks in the early 2000s\, optical emission attacks will very likely result
  in the need to introduce new countermeasures during the design of semicon
 ductor chips. 
LOCATION:Lecture Theatre 2\, Computer Laboratory\, William Gates Building
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