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SUMMARY:Chip and PIN is broken - Steven J. Murdoch (Computer Laboratory\, 
 University of Cambridge)
DTSTART:20100514T150000Z
DTEND:20100514T153000Z
UID:TALK24921@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Steven J. Murdoch
DESCRIPTION:EMV is the dominant protocol used for smart card payments worl
 dwide\, with over 730 million cards in circulation. Known to bank customer
 s as “Chip and PIN”\, it is used in Europe\; it is being introduced in
  Canada\; and there is pressure from banks to introduce it in the USA too.
  EMV secures credit and debit card transactions by authenticating both the
  card and the customer presenting it through a combination of cryptographi
 c authentication codes\, digital signatures\, and the entry of a PIN. In t
 his paper we describe and demonstrate a protocol flaw which allows crimina
 ls to use a genuine card to make a payment without knowing the card’s PI
 N\, and to remain undetected even when the merchant has an online connecti
 on to the banking network. The fraudster performs a man-in-the-middle atta
 ck to trick the terminal into believing the PIN verified correctly\, while
  telling the issuing bank that no PIN was entered at all. The paper consid
 ers how the flaws arose\, why they remained unknown despite EMV’s wide d
 eployment for the best part of a decade\, and how they might be fixed. Bec
 ause we have found and validated a practical attack against the core funct
 ionality of EMV\, we conclude that the protocol is broken. This failure is
  significant in the field of protocol design\, and also has important publ
 ic policy implications\, in light of growing reports of fraud on stolen EM
 V cards. Frequently\, banks deny such fraud victims a refund\, asserting t
 hat a card cannot be used without the correct PIN\, and concluding that th
 e customer must be grossly negligent or lying. Our attack can explain a nu
 mber of these cases\, and exposes the need for further research to bridge 
 the gap between the theoretical and practical security of bank payment sys
 tems.
LOCATION:Computer Laboratory\, William Gates Building\, Room FW26
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