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SUMMARY:Self-enforcing agreements in the control of immunizing infectious 
 - Dr Petra Klepac\, DAMTP
DTSTART:20121105T113000Z
DTEND:20121105T123000Z
UID:TALK40778@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Prof. Julia Gog
DESCRIPTION:Regional and global elimination of immunization infections req
 uire transboundary cooperation and coordination.  In a highly interconnect
 ed world\, transboundary mobility of populations could promote free-riding
  in vaccination efforts between populations and result in lower vaccinatio
 n coverage in each population relative to the global optimum.  In the abse
 nce of a global body that can impose a universal vaccination strategy\, in
 centives for individual countries to invest in vaccination are influenced 
 by their neighbor’s vaccination coverage and the ability to form volunta
 ry coalitions that reward countries that join by cooperatively increasing 
 vaccination coverage.  Here we explore conditions that support self-enforc
 ing coalitions using epidemiological models embedded in a game theoretic f
 ramework. We find that by forming coalitions\, countries can achieve much 
 higher vaccination coverage at a lower cost than when acting independently
 . Furthermore\, when asymmetric countries form coalitions\, realized cover
 age is regionally more consistent and equitable.
LOCATION:CC43\, Cripps Court\, Queens' College
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