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SUMMARY:Static Analysis of Cache Side Channels - Boris Koepf\, IMDEA
DTSTART:20130910T130000Z
DTEND:20130910T140000Z
UID:TALK47108@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Microsoft Research Cambridge Talks Admins
DESCRIPTION:Side-channel attacks recover secret inputs to programs from ph
 ysical characteristics of computations\, such as execution time or power c
 onsumption. CPU caches are a particularly rich source of side channels bec
 ause their behavior heavily impacts execution time and can be monitored in
  various ways.\n\nCacheAudit is a novel platform that enables the automati
 c\, static analysis of such cache side channels\; it takes as input a prog
 ram binary and a cache configuration\, and it derives formal\, quantitativ
 e security guarantees for a comprehensive set of side-channel adversaries\
 , namely those based on observing cache states\, traces of\nhits and misse
 s\, and execution times.\n\nIn this talk I will present the theoretical fo
 undations and the architecture of CacheAudit\, and the results we obtain w
 hen analysing library implementations of symmetric cryptosystems such as A
 ES or Salsa.  I will conclude with an outlook on how CacheAudit can be use
 d for engineering certified proofs of security of leakage-resilient crypto
 systems on platforms with concurrency and caches. \n\n
LOCATION:Auditorium\, Microsoft Research Ltd\, 21 Station Road\, Cambridge
 \, CB1 2FB
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