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SUMMARY:Distance bounding protocols: Authentication logic analysis - Cathe
 rine Meadows\, Naval Research Laboratory
DTSTART:20061006T150000Z
DTEND:20061006T160000Z
UID:TALK5423@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Saar Drimer
DESCRIPTION:The analysis of cryptographic protocols is by now a well estab
 lished application area for formal methods.  However\, there are many prot
 ocols that go beyond the traditional Dolev-Yao model for which these forma
 l methods have been developed. In this talk we examine a particular class 
 of such protocols\, distance bounding protocols\, designed to authenticate
  distance measurements in sensor networks. These rely not only on assumpti
 ons about the soundness of cryptographic functions\, but on physical assum
 ptions about the time of flight of signals. We adapt the authentication lo
 gic of Pavlovic\, Meadows\, and Cervesato to reason about these protocols 
 by incorporating the physical assumptions necessary as axioms and definiti
 ons in the system\, and apply it to the analysis of a family of distance b
 ounding protocols. We also discuss the potential for adding probabilistic 
 reasoning to the logic to better capture the necessary physical assumption
 s.
LOCATION:Lecture Theatre 1\, Computer Laboratory\, William Gates Building
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