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SUMMARY:Unmasking Philosophers’ Fiction: First-Person Reference\, Monste
 r Operators\, and the Indexical/Nonindexical Distinction - Professor Katar
 zyna Jaszczolt (DTAL\, Universtiy of Cambridge)
DTSTART:20150528T150000Z
DTEND:20150528T163000Z
UID:TALK59286@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Theodora Alexopoulou
DESCRIPTION:It is standardly acknowledged in the semantic and philosophica
 l literature that ‘I’ is an example of an indexical expression\, or a 
 so-called ‘pure indexical’. This claim appears plausible in that it is
  an expression whose reference can shift from context to context. But this
  is where the incontrovertible definition ends. Indexicals are generally a
 ssumed to be devices of direct reference: its role is supposed to be exhau
 sted in contributing the referent to the proposition. Next\, in terms of K
 aplan’s (1989) two-dimensional semantics\, indexicals have a context-sen
 sitive character which\, once fixed in a context\, leads to a content that
  does not vary with circumstances of evaluation. According to Kaplan\, the
  semantic value of an indexical is fixed by the context of the current spe
 ech act\, except for its occurrences in quotation. Putative operators that
  would shift the semantic value are called ‘monsters’ and are deemed n
 ot to exist. Subsequent discussions have demonstrated\, however\, that the
  content of pure indexicals can be fixed by the intended speech act (Prede
 lli 2011\, 2014\; Corazza 2004). ‘Fixity’ also proves untenable for Am
 haric where the referent of a first-person pronoun in a propositional atti
 tude construction can come either from the context of the reporting or the
  reported situation (Schlenker 2003). In this paper I take a more global p
 erspective on these problems and argue – and demonstrate\, using the beh
 aviour of the first-person pronoun in English as well as devices for self-
 reference in a cross-linguistic perspective (Jaszczolt 2013a\, b) – that
  (i) devices standardly used for self-reference do not have the properties
  they are assumed to have and that (ii) the indexical/nonindexical distinc
 tion does not stand up to scrutiny. This opens up the debate as to whether
  a theoretical construct of an indexical can be defended if it does not co
 rrespond to linguistic realisations that are specified for this role. I su
 pport the argument with the discussion of first-person pronouns in mixed q
 uotation\, showing that (iii) mixed quotation ought not to be excluded fro
 m potential ‘monsters’ in that it is an instance of language use rathe
 r than mention and as such can testify against fixity\, and (iv) mixed quo
 tation induces context-shifts or a generalisation over contexts that can b
 e captured in terms of what I call a ‘character-at-issue’ and ‘conte
 nt-at-issue’ use. Contextualist accounts appear to be best suited to cap
 ture the diversity of use of linguistic expressions but they do not pursue
  the interpretation of first-person pronouns to its logical end. To remedy
  this weakness\, I demonstrate how the use of first-person ‘indexicals
 ’ in these alleged ‘monster contexts’ can be accounted for in the ra
 dical contextualist theory of Default Semantics (Jaszczolt 2005\, 2010\, i
 n press).
LOCATION:GR06/07\, English Faculty Building\, 9 West Road\, Sidgwick Site
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