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SUMMARY:Idealization\, abstraction and the ontic view of explanation - Mar
 ta Halina (Department of History and Philosophy of Science)
DTSTART:20150520T120000Z
DTEND:20150520T133000Z
UID:TALK59302@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Christopher Clarke
DESCRIPTION:The ontic causal-mechanical view of explanation holds that mod
 els are explanatory insofar as they convey information about those mechani
 sms responsible for a phenomenon of interest. A common criticism of this\n
 view is that it fails to account for the explanatory practices of science.
  Scientists do not aim to develop complete and accurate models of causal m
 echanisms\, the criticism goes\, but rely on abstract and idealized models
  to explain instead. I argue that this criticism misses precisely the poin
 t that proponents of the ontic view have taken pains to convey - that expl
 anation and understanding are\ndistinct. While an explanation is the targe
 t of an explanatory model\, certain features of that model (such as its ab
 stract and idealized nature) may lead to greater understanding. The goals 
 of explanation\nand understanding impose distinct constraints on modeling 
 practices. The ontic view is able to account for this dual set of constrai
 nts\, while the epistemic view (the position commonly adopted by the criti
 cs) fails to do so unless it is supplemented by a set of ontic commitments
  about the sorts of things that are the proper referent of an explanatory 
 model.
LOCATION:Seminar Room 2\, Department of History and Philosophy of Science
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