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SUMMARY:Bank Resolution and the Structure of Global Banks - Martin Oehmke\
 , Associate Professor of Finance at Columbia Business School
DTSTART:20160301T103000Z
DTEND:20160301T120000Z
UID:TALK64607@talks.cam.ac.uk
CONTACT:Crystal
DESCRIPTION:We study the efficient resolution of global banks by national 
 regulators. Single-point-of- entry (SPOE) resolution\, where loss-absorbin
 g capacity is shared across jurisdictions\, is efficient\, but may not be 
 implementable. First\, when expected transfers across jurisdictions are to
 o asymmetric\, national regulators fail to set up an efficient SPOE resolu
 tion regime ex ante. Second\, when the required ex-post transfers across j
 urisdictions are too large\, national regulators ring-fence local banking 
 assets\, instead of cooperating in a planned SPOE resolution. In this case
 \, constrained efficient resolution is achieved through multiple-point-of-
 entry (MPOE) resolution\, where some loss-absorbing capacity is pre-assign
 ed to national holding companies in each jurisdiction. Our analysis highli
 ghts a complementarity between bank resolution and the organizational stru
 cture of global banks—the more decentralized a global bank’s operation
 s\, the greater the relative efficiency of MPOE resolution. 
LOCATION:Cambidge Judge Business School\, Castle Teaching Room
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